

UKRAINE

IN HISTORIES

AND STORIES

ESSAYS BY UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS

UKRAINE

IN HISTORIES AND STORIES

ESSAYS BY UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS



• Hrytsak • Ploky • Andrukhovych • Kurkov • Yermolenko
• Bondar • Karpa • Shyyan • Kebuladze • Denysenko •
Rafeenko • Aliev • Hnatiuk • Finberg • Portnov • Shelest •

UKRAINE

IN HISTORIES AND STORIES

ESSAYS BY UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS

Edited by *Volodymyr Yermolenko*

Preface by *Peter Pomerantsev*

Introduction by *Andriy Kulakov*



Kyiv
2019

The book is published with the support of Ukrainian Cultural Foundation.

The ideas expressed in this book belong exclusively to the individual authors of the texts and do not necessarily coincide with the views of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation



Ukraine in histories and stories. Essays by Ukrainian intellectuals — Kyiv: Internews Ukraine, UkraineWorld, 2019. — 304 p.

This book is a collection of texts by contemporary Ukrainian intellectuals: writers, historians, philosophers, political analysts, opinion leaders. The texts have been written for the international audience. The collection combines reflections on Ukraine's history (or histories, in plural), and analysis of the present, conceptual ideas and life stories. The book presents a multi-faceted image of Ukrainian memory and reality: from the Holodomor to Maidan, from Russian aggression to cultural diversity, from the depth of the past to the complexity of the present.

ISBN 978-617-684-243-9

Any part of this publication can be used, whether partly or in full, only after prior agreement with NGO Internews Ukraine and Ukrainian Cultural Foundation, and only with the reference to the original publication.

© Peter Pomerantsev, Andriy Kulakov, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Serhii Plokyh, Yuri Andrukhovych, Andriy Kurkov, Volodymyr Yermolenko, Andriy Bondar, Irena Karpa, Haska Shyyan, Larysa Denysenko, Vakhtang Kebuladze, Volodymyr Rafeenko, Alim Aliev, Ola Hnatiuk, Leonid Finberg, Andriy Portnov, Hanna Shelest, Hromadske, 2019

© Internews Ukraine, 2019

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|------------|
| PREFACE by <i>Peter Pomerantsev</i> | 9 |
| INTRODUCTION: Tabula rasa, or How to Find A Ukrainian Terra Incognita, by <i>Andriy Kulakov</i> | 13 |
| HISTORIES | |
| Ukraine: A Brief but Global History of Ukrainian Bread, by <i>Yaroslav Hrytsak</i> | 23 |
| Rus', Cossacks and Ukraine's Identity, interview with <i>Serhii Plokyh</i> | 43 |
| IDENTITIES | |
| Ukrainian Culture and Literature, interview with <i>Yuri Andrukhovych</i> | 61 |
| Ukrainians. From A Historical Matrix to the Present Day, by <i>Andriy Kurkov</i> | 89 |
| ARCHETYPES | |
| Steppe, Empire, and Cruelty, by <i>Volodymyr Yermolenko</i> | 103 |
| A Split Heart of Incompleteness, by <i>Andriy Bondar</i> | 121 |
| STORIES | |
| Ukraine as a Movie, by <i>Irena Karpa</i> | 137 |
| You Know It Better Than Me, by <i>Haska Shyyan</i> | 153 |

MOTHERLANDS

- Majority as a Minority, by *Larysa Denysenko* 169
Gaining a Motherland, by *Vakhtang Kebuladze* 185

PAINS

- Donbas - Ukraine, a Life Journey, by *Volodymyr Rafeenko* 201
Ukraine and Crimean Tatars, interview with *Alim Aliev* 215

RELATIONS

- Ukrainian-Polish relations, interview with *Ola Hnatiuk* 229
Ukrainians and Jews, interview with *Leonid Finberg* 253

STEREOTYPES

- Neither Admiration Nor Fear:
Stereotypes About Ukraine in Germany, by *Andriy Portnov* 273
Insecure Security of Ukraine, by *Hanna Shelest* 287





Insecure Security of Ukraine



For the last 5 years, I have been talking about Ukraine, conflict, security, Russia, in unison and separately on so many occasions that one can struggle to find new words, new arguments and new internal forces to persuade, to explain and to just discuss the issue. Sometimes, you are lacking words as you think that everything is so logical, so how is it that your colleagues cannot understand what is happening? Or do they understand, and just do not want to accept it? Or do they accept it, and are at ease with their conscience?

The second dilemma is how do you speak about security in Ukraine without talking about Russia? Very often, our discussions are so Russia-centric, that they do not go beyond the issue. While Russia is definitely, in the current conditions, the biggest threat to the national security of Ukraine and regional security in Europe, and to be precise, it has been for quite a time in contemporary history, nevertheless, to talk about security and to look only at Russia means to undermine Ukraine itself, to follow the Russian discourse and the perception of the world that they would like us to see.

Let us start from the end. In order to guarantee our security we need to go beyond Russia, to debunk some of the myths it has been

imposing on us for generations, to build our own resilience and reliable network of partners. But also, to demonstrate that despite the conflict, Ukraine is no longer just a security recipient, but a security provider for Europe.

Before 2014, I had studied conflicts for about 10 years. I visited conflict zones and post-conflict societies in Europe and Asia, had hundreds of hours of conversations about peace, security, conflict resolution and reconciliation. I thought I knew how complex conflicts are, the logic behind them, how to mitigate their consequences or to prevent their development. I just didn't know how difficult it is when conflict comes to your land, what the feeling of insecurity means even when fighting is taking place 700 km from where you live.

Unfortunately, we are all used to conflicts or pictures of war. Media outlets have made it such a familiar and daily occurrence. We feel sorrow for one killed person, we easily consider it a statistic, when hundreds are killed and millions displaced. People in Western or Central Ukraine realize it is an ongoing armed conflict in their country only when somebody who's wounded or killed return to their neighbourhood. Therefore, what can be said about the Spanish, Belgians or Swiss, who may have seen some videos in the evening news, but even then did not realize that the reality of war has returned to Europe?

With all of this insecure world around us, we do not know whether absence of war really means peace and security, or with all new methods and tools that are being used, the feeling of insecurity is something that will define our generation. Security is in flux. For a few decades already, while talking about European or Black Sea security, we have predominantly analysed issues of soft security. We have talked more and more about human security, energy security, environmental security, information security, trafficking and organized crime, illegal migration, sustainable governance. Most of us experts paid little attention to the classical, hard, military security.

🗨️ **The year of 2014 took us back to the rhetoric that the majority of Europeans had forgotten - occupation, annexation, spheres of influences, aggression against a sovereign state, violation of territorial integrity, the list can go on and on.** 🗨️

Russian aggression really has changed a lot. In 2008, Europe thought that the short Russian-Georgian war was merely a continuation of separatist conflicts in Georgia. It was too short and a cease-fire was negotiated so quickly, that many European politicians considered it merely an incident. In 2014, the scope and manner of the aggression caught not only Ukraine unprepared, both morally and military. However, the problem is that 2014 was not a beginning but the continuation of Moscow's long-built policy and strategy, the strategy that had introduced narratives, myths, perceptions, without the deconstructing of which it will be impossible to talk about Ukrainian security.

Moreover, we, Ukrainians, wished to think that our crisis is unique. Our politicians and diplomats have been trying to present Ukraine as an outstanding case and that all efforts on the part of the international community should be directed immediately towards Ukraine. We did not want to accept that we are competing with other conflicts and crises around the globe – for media attention, for international support. It sounds odd – competing conflicts... Still, how should we explain to the international community that when a part of our territory is brutally annexed using military forces, but not killing hundreds of people (as it happened with Crimea), it is just important as when explosions killing hundreds occurred in Baghdad or Aleppo.

After 5 years, we have learnt how to fight, but we're still learning how to speak with the international community. How to persuade other countries not to back off, not to lift sanctions, not to return to "business as usual" with Russia. How to see Ukraine not as a problem of European security, but as an integral part of it. How to make our

arguments more pragmatic and sharp, but not emotional, so as to speak the same language as other European capitals speak.

We are still fighting for narratives, we are still battling against myths and stereotypes, and we're still lacking security.

The Myth of In-Betweenness or Being a “Cushion”

You hear less recently about Ukraine being a buffer zone – a concept winning all popularity prizes in the 1990s and 2000s. A bridge, a buffer zone, the destiny of an in-betweenner, a grey zone. You can continue this list of analogies that we've all had to face at hundreds of international conferences and in articles written by both Russian and Western authors. Unfortunately, this concept is coming back in analysis of the roots of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict.

I always asked: is it logical to call the second biggest country in Europe a buffer zone? More than a thousand kilometres from East to West, with the geographical centre of Europe located on its Western border, 46 million people – which is far too many for a buffer zone.

As the term “buffer zone” had been receiving more and more negative comments from experts, a new term appeared recently – “in-betweenness”. It's an even more ambiguous term, which demonstrates not only an absence of subjectivity, but also of the functional role assigned to it. The problem with “in-betweenness” is not only that it rejects subjectivity towards Ukraine. For me, it does not even make it an object of the foreign policy of neighbouring states.

A buffer zone, in-betweenness – these are all clichés and narratives that were created when somebody didn't know how to deal with the situation of the collapsed Soviet Union, and were not ready to accept Ukraine to the European fold mentally, and not even institutionally. Already understanding that Ukraine is not Russia, and spheres of influence is not a concept that Europeans want to follow, they still lack the courage to oppose such Russian narratives.

In 2014, I heard a term in Rome usually used by Italians, that struck even more – a “cushion”, a nice word for a pillow for your chair, and used instead of the boring “buffer zone”. It seems to me that it describes the situation, its perception and attitude of many Europeans towards Ukraine much better than any academic terms.

👉 **Nevertheless, a buffer zone is never a secure one for you; it is never a stable and developed place.** 👈

It is either terra incognita, or a place to stay as far away as possible for your own security. Is it what Europe wanted for Ukraine?

“You Cannot Fight Russia”

Another narrative that we all heard for the last 5 years, thousands of times, from Chicago to Astana, is that you cannot fight Russia. Why? They are big and aggressive. So what? When you are being raped, you do not think that your offender is bigger and stronger, you are fighting for your life and dignity, you call the police (international community) to help, and in good societies, you put the offender into a jail.

You could say that this comparison is very emotional. Yes, it is. But what should be done when the majority of calls to observe the norms and principles of international law and practice do not work, when there are still members of the European Parliament and national parliaments who are eager to lift sanctions against Russia that were introduced after the illegal annexation of Crimea? When your opponents repeat – ‘do not poke a bear’ as a mantra.

We are emotional about our peace and security. We know you do not like it. But neither did we like it when we travelled to the Caucasus or Balkans before 2013. Neither did we understand why it is so difficult to reconcile, we also did not value our safety and security enough.

The problem is that you CAN fight Russia. You do not want to, but who really wants a war except an aggressor? It is normal to reject the

option of war and armed resolution of disputes. It is normal to seek negotiations instead of provocations. What is not normal is to appease an aggressor. It is like starting discussions with a rapist whether the victim should wear a longer skirt or should a court rule two years in prison and not 10, instead of investigating the crime committed and handing out punishment.

We cannot (or should not) fight Russia? No, we can and we will, because we are defending ourselves. We are motivated, we have a reason. We are not like we were in 2014, we are different. Yes, we are still not united. Yes, there are still enough people who are not interested in what is happening and do not want to think about who is to blame and who is not to blame. Yes, there are still intense Russian propaganda and information operations against Ukrainians and Europeans aimed at sowing doubt among people as to the real reasons behind the conflict.

🗨️ **'You cannot fight Russia' is a myth and a narrative imposed by Moscow.** 🗨️



The reasons are simple. First, to start having doubts in your government and army, in their capacities. Then in your partners and strategic alliances like NATO – will they really be ready and willing to protect you, to help you (ask Estonians, were they 100% sure whether NATO allies would introduce Article 5 of the Washington Treaty if Russian “green men” appeared on their territory in 2014?). And finally, yet importantly, to create an image of how strong and influential, especially in military terms, Russia is, that everybody will be afraid to fight.

However, the Ukrainian Army is changing rapidly. We are no longer just a recipient of security. For the last five years, Ukrainian security and military services have been protecting not only Ukrainian sovereignty and peaceful sleep. Economic sanctions imposed against Russia are a small price that the EU has had to pay.

While Ukrainian society has had to pay with the lives of about 13,000 people (according to UN data), of whom one third are civilians, 30 thousand wounded, and 1,388,972 officially registered internally displaced people.

These are only official statistics, and the real numbers are, unfortunately, bigger and growing on a daily basis.

Of all the state institutions, the military are among the most trusted, as more than 50% of Ukrainians trust the army. Within the last few years, most serious reforms have been implemented in the military field, from adopting NATO standards in logistics, command and control to training through practice and reaching both necessary combat readiness and interoperability with NATO partners. The Annual National Program Ukraine-NATO (ANP) is a complex and comprehensive document that is no longer a list of activities and round tables, but a vision of the whole scope of reforms. Some European states are still afraid to grant Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) – the arguments are from the same “do not poke a bear” basket. Nevertheless, ANP 2019 is de facto like a MAP. The reforms, readiness and necessity to protect one’s sovereignty is what is making Ukraine oppose the statement that “we cannot fight Russia”.

 **The problem is that when NATO has been updating its strategies, naming Russia a partner and searching for cooperation, Moscow still mentioned the Alliance as a “danger” in its strategic documents.** 

When the EU was introducing its neighbourhood policy, Russian official doctrines stated that they were ready to use any means to protect its interests in a so-called “near neighbourhood”. This dichotomy is what still influences some decision-makers.

Neither Ukraine nor its partners were ready to fight in 2014, but it does not mean we did not learn how to do it, and how to do it well. But to fight effectively does not mean only to use force, it’s also

about building alliances, trusting in your partners, and demonstrating a different paradigm of relations between states.

The New Cold War Is Coming

For some people to understand current events it is easier to return to a paradigm of the Cold War, where you had two superpowers, spheres of influence and a certain logic of development in relations. It also enables various Sovietologists to return to the media and academic scenes and to present their colourful scenarios, including the notion that if the West did not provoke Russia, Moscow would not need to aggressively protect its interests. What is interesting enough is that such rhetoric can be heard from both sides of the former Iron Curtain.

However, it is not a New World Order. It is not a new Cold War. Both need a certain notion of order, meaning certain rules and principles that all actors agree to follow. And at present we are not even formulating new rules and principles. We pretend that we are satisfied with the Helsinki principles, and UN conventions and norms. However, when one state is trying to comply with them in full and the other one is completely ignoring them... what kind of order is that?

I clearly understand that any international agreement and convention is a kind of gentlemen's agreement. Even when a certain sanctions mechanism is envisaged for those who violate the norms, the implications for this are still not automatic. Different schools of international relations explain differently why states and governments agree to limit and restrict themselves with certain norms. Some stress it is goodwill and understanding future implications. Others insist that it is just a pragmatic and practical decision, because to follow the rules is either cheaper or more beneficial for everyone. However, the core idea remains – states agree voluntarily to these rules of the game.

Surely, in certain periods of time, different interpretations of norms are possible. Neither have disputes been rare in international relations

over the last 70 years. Otherwise, all international courts and tribunals would not have had any work.

 **The Ukrainian case became unprecedented because it is difficult to find an international convention that the Russian Federation is not violating.** 

Even in cases when legislation and decisions are clear Russians still do not implement them. The latest example is the International Tribunal in Hamburg, which ruled that Russia must immediately release Ukrainian Navy sailors and ships captured illegally in November 2018 near the Kerch Strait. Moscow has not only refused to release the sailors in a timely manner, but also tried to use the issue to bargain with Paris, Berlin and Kyiv – to make European parliamentarians bring back Russian MPs to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and Ukraine to agree to sue its own sailors in accordance with Russian law, de facto recognizing the illegal annexation of Crimea.

That is why the whole situation with Russia's return to the PACE is so dangerous, and was so actively opposed by Ukrainian MPs. Russia regards this not as goodwill and an invitation for dialogue, but as weakness on the part of Europe, as an invitation to continue ignoring international principles and norms. Did Europe see any rapprochement after it allowed the Russian delegation to return without fulfilling any of the clauses of previous PACE resolutions? No. Russia immediately proposed the appointment as vice-president of a person who is under EU sanctions and who was recently in a big scandal concerning sexual harassment. A perfect candidate to lead an organization who declares the protection of human rights as its highest priorities.

 **It is difficult to talk about Ukraine and its security without talking about Russia. Not because Ukraine cannot be without Russia, but because Moscow has monopolized the discourse.** 

The Kremlin has managed to persuade the international community that you cannot speak about Ukraine and its security without Russia, however, you can talk about Ukraine without Ukraine. The demarche of the Ukrainian delegation to PACE in June 2019 demonstrated that this way of thinking is no longer acceptable for Ukraine. Support expressed by MPs from seven other countries also proved the value of each individual and each choice of country and moral decision when you are entering times of the new disorder.

“Frozen” Conflict as a Solution

After five years, Ukrainians have learnt how to fight. Both diplomatic and military fronts are hot. Civil society is sharpening its tools. Thus, so many of us want to talk with our counterparts in Washington, Brussels or Berlin about different Ukraine. To discuss constructive cooperation rather than fight at each available front. That is when some politicians start to propose the idea of “freezing” Donbas, so as “to allow other parts of Ukraine to develop”.

However, the “frozen conflict” solution is not an option. Usually it is not a conflict, which is frozen, but only its resolution. It can sound very provocative, but when people are not killed, the chances are less that the sides to a conflict will really search for ways to end it. History has had a lot of examples, when after a cease-fire, the parties start endless talks about talks, and for years cannot decide on simple questions that can build a road to peace. Ukraine have seen it in conflicts near its borders, for example, in Transnistria. With every new day of the “frozen conflict”, you receive new ambiguity, the habit to live in a vague legal status, development of parallel structures and realities of cooperation, with criminal circles cooperating better than government ones.

The longer conflict goes on, the more difficult it is to find a solution. It is a vicious circle, Catch 22 – the people are ready, but governments cannot find a common language, there is a pace of time, governments

can understand the necessity and be ready, but... the population is used to living with a conflict and an image of an enemy, a generation can grow up, who knows an adversary only as the quintessence of evil. Therefore, at this moment, leaders will be afraid to compromise, to finish a war, because they are not sure whether their people will accept such peace.

The Donbas conflict is only five years long, but due to the different level of information influence that the world had even 20 years ago, we can already see how perceptions about each other are changing. To sign a cease-fire agreement will be the easiest thing to do. Reconciliation and reconstruction is what will be needed for a real fight with ourselves, with the reality on the ground, with created myths.

The red lines will remain. For many post-conflict societies, different things made up this set of burning items. Ethnic minority rights, border regimes or distribution of resources – each of them can be that very issue that prevents further reconciliation or becoming a delayed-action mine in the peace process. If some issues, like an amnesty, are already seen as those that can create these dispute elements in Ukraine, others can create a far more serious spillover effect. For example, the idea of federalisation.

Autonomy for the separatist regions sounds so easy for our international colleagues to implement. Our German partners could not understand for a long time what is so problematic for Ukraine to accept the idea of federalisation.

The mediators proposed certain models derived from their own perception of terminology. Back in 1995, the USA, as a federal country, in which individual states enjoy broad powers, did not perceive the new constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina as something risky. The same can be said about Germany's position in the Minsk process, which saw the proposal of "federalisation" through the eyes of a well-functioning federal state, as a properly managed decentralisation of powers rather than as a mechanism for one or two regions

to control the central government, which is the Russian idea behind the federalisation of Ukraine.

As far as Russia is concerned, federalisation does not mean decentralisation of the country, as in granting regions greater powers and responsibilities for the management of local issues. In their interpretation, the idea of “federalisation” does not apply to the whole country, but rather means a separation of two particular regions, with no clear boundaries, which should have special status, in many ways greater than any administrative entities have within federal states. The idea expounded by Russia is to turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional and divided state.

On the contrary, Ukraine has been using the term “decentralisation”, which assumes administrative reform being implemented in the country. This reform should result in greater responsibilities for all regions and better distribution of financial resources. For Ukraine, which has been struggling for centuries due to its partition by other states, ideas of “federalisation” are viewed above all from this standpoint – not to allow new, additional divisions within the country.



Freedom is our religion

Many colleagues used to say that Ukraine received its independence in 1991 too easily, too peacefully. Therefore, in 2014 it paid the price and has been overcoming what many other post-Soviet states went through at the beginning of the 1990s.

My Russian colleagues often stated in disputes: how it is possible to speak with Ukraine when it does not have a joint position about Donbas, when each party had their views and propositions. I always reply that it is a democracy, it is a plurality of opinions, and it is important that any of them can propose their vision for return, reconciliation or prosecution. What is significant is, that for all of them, for all of us, Ukrainians, there are few denominators that absolutely nobody is questioning – sovereignty and territorial

integrity of the state, freedom to choose by ourselves, which rulers to have and which alliances to join.

In 2017, at the revolutionary square in Kyiv known to the world as Maidan, a huge banner appeared, covering a trade union building that burnt in 2014, which stated – “Freedom is our religion”. Now this slogan looks so natural, we’re used to it and we state it so often, forgetting that it has an author – Hennadiy Kurochka, Managing Partner of the Kyiv-based strategic communications company CFC Consulting introduced it to make a powerful statement in the middle of the city hosting the Eurovision Song Contest. Could he have imagined that this slogan would become a part of national discourse?

 **Freedom is not anarchy. Freedom is also responsibility. When nobody is controlling you, you are not only free to choose, but also responsible for your choices.** 

Ukraine is making its choices constantly. We, Ukrainians, are making our choices all the time. Are they always good ones? Definitely not. But when you are free to make decisions, there is nobody to blame for them.

In Europe, people forgot what it means to value their freedom. Freedom of choice, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of speech. They became so natural, an integral part of life, that many citizens forget how nations struggled and fought for them.

The illusion of stability is what we are struggling against now. This is the manipulation of narratives: the Soviet Union was stable; Russia is stable, so why not to give up some part of our freedom to return that illusion of stability? Such a notion has been promoted very often.

The problem is that you cannot give away just a little bit of freedom. I do not want us to confuse lack of freedom with delegation of a part of our sovereignty to supranational institutions. Because

such delegation also happens voluntarily. When you give up your freedom, the chances are high that you'll lose your dignity.

Resilience as the Answer

Ukraine is building up its resilience. It does not mean that we know how to solve every problem, but at least we're getting immune to them. Most Ukrainian experts have already understood that the current security crisis will continue. The development of so-called hybrid warfare against Ukraine has become a suitable instrument for disturbance. The biggest problem is that you cannot completely prevent such warfare. You cannot build walls or train your army in the same way you do for open fighting. Hybrid warfare is finding new means and tools, new weak points in your society, new reasons to be used. Hybrid warfare is not just about military aspects and security. It is about a society and a state.

However, resilience, even that this concept is still developing, should be regarded as a vaccine. It will not allow us to prevent disease, but it will allow our society and state to be prepared, to overcome symptoms quicker and easier, to continue functioning and to guarantee security to our citizens.

What is good in the development of resilience is that it can push for cooperation not only with traditional partners, but also with those who are hesitating about closer security cooperation as they fear its politicization.

The most difficult thing for us has always been to explain around the world that it is not just about Ukraine. It is not a Ukrainian crisis, a Ukrainian problem, or a Ukrainian conflict. Not because we are repudiating responsibility and want the world to save us.

 **The root of this conflict is not in Ukraine. We merely became a trigger, a quintessence of the Russian problem.** 

That is not to blame Moscow for all our problems. If Ukraine were more stable, integral, would fight corruption and develop its state institutions, then perhaps Russia would not be able to interfere in Ukraine so easily. But history does not like conditional clauses. Reluctance to oppose Russian actions in Ukraine led to interference in other European states. If it started with elections, it does not mean it will quite end there.

European integration and future membership of NATO is also a part of resilience for Ukraine. Resilience is the ability of your state to function even when a crisis is taking place. European integration is seen by many in Ukraine as a way to create such functional state institutions. NATO is seen as a way to create security and military services capable of protecting us.

Many European countries do not themselves present the best example of such resilience. The rise of populism and nationalism, the ability of Russia to interfere in elections and to sponsor political parties, difficulties with cyber-attacks – all these problems are clearly visible to partner-states.

Ukrainians went onto Maidan in 2014 carrying European flags, not because European integration was their core demand, but because they saw the EU as a symbol of all those things, they wanted to reach – democracy, freedom of media and assembly, punishment for corruption and accountable government, reforms that lead to development and innovation, not to stagnation and the monopolization of power. The 2019 elections were the first transition of power to take place without a change in the political course.

The insecure security of Ukraine is not a destiny, but merely conditions that we can overcome. Overcome if we build resilience and partnership, and not buffer zones.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

Alim Aliev is a Ukrainian Crimean Tatar activist and the program director of Crimean House, a Crimean Tatar cultural center in Kyiv. Journalist, human rights activist and co-founder of Krym-SOS (a human rights initiative to help internally displaced persons from Crimea after its illegal annexation by Russia). Co-author of the book *Muštafa Dzhemilev. Unbroken*. Coordinator of the Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar literary competition and festival *Crimean Fig*. Rapporteur at advocacy missions of international institutions on the situation in Crimea.

Yuri Andrukhovych is a world-renowned contemporary Ukrainian writer. He's the author of the novels *Recreations, The Moscoviad, Perverzion, Twelve Circles, Mystery, Lexicon of Intimate Cities, Darlings of Justice* and many others. Laureate of the Herder Prize (2001), Erich Maria Remarque Peace Prize (2005), Leipzig Book Fair Prize (2006), Angelus Award (2006), Hannah Arendt Prize (2014), Goethe Medal (2016), winner of the BBC (Ukrainian Service) Book of the Year Prize (2018). His texts are available in Ukrainian, English, German, Polish, French, Russian, Swedish, Spanish and many other languages.

Andrij Bondar is a Ukrainian writer and translator. He wrote the books *Truth and Honey, Primitive Forms of Ownership, Carrot Ice, For Those in the Graves*. His latest book, *Cerebro*, received the BBC Book of the Year Award for the best Ukrainian book of essays in 2018.

Larysa Denysenko is a Ukrainian writer, lawyer, human rights activist and UN Goodwill Ambassador for Tolerance in Ukraine. She is also a radio presenter, and member of the Executive Board of PEN Ukraine. She is the author of the books *Echo, New Old Elder Woman, Maya and Her Moms* and others.

Leonid Finberg is one of the leading Ukrainian researchers of Jewish culture, Director of the Center for the Studies of History and Culture of East European Jewry in Kyiv, Editor-in-Chief of the *Dukh i Litera* [Spirit and Letter] Publishing House, and a member of the Executive Board of PEN Ukraine.

Ola Hnatiuk is a Polish-Ukrainian researcher in Ukrainian studies, professor at Warsaw University and Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Her book *Courage and Fear* won the grand prix at the Ukrainian Publishers' Forum in Lviv in 2015 (the English language version will be published this autumn at the Academic Study Press and Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute). Her other book, *Farewell to Empire*, received the Jerzy Giedroyc Prize (2004). She is also the author of numerous other books and articles on history, culture, politics and literature.

Yaroslav Hrytsak is one of the most well-known Ukrainian historians and public intellectuals, professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. He is the author of more than 500 academic publications on historical issues. His books include *Essays in Ukrainian History: Making of Modern Ukrainian Nation, Passions around Nationalism, Where the World Is Going, A Prophet in His Country. Franko and His Community*, and others.

Irena Karpa is a Ukrainian writer, screenwriter, singer, journalist, TV presenter, member of PEN Ukraine. She is the author of the books *Bitches Get Everything, The Good and the Bad, Good News from the Aral Sea* and others.



Vakhtang Kebuladze is a Ukrainian philosopher, essayist, translator, specialist in German philosophy and humanities. Professor at the Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. He wrote the books *Meshes of Fate* and *Phenomenology of Experience*. He won the 2016 Yuri Sheveliov Prize for the best Ukrainian book of essays.

Andriy Kurkov is a world-renowned Ukrainian novelist, journalist, and screenwriter. President of PEN Ukraine. He is the author of dozens of books, including *Death and the Penguin* with its sequel *Penguin Lost*, *Ukraine Diaries: Dispatches from Kyiv*, *Grey Bees* and others. He writes mostly in Russian; his books are translated into 37 languages.

Serhii Plokhy is a world-famous Ukrainian historian, director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute in the USA. Author of *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*, *The Cossack Myth*, *Yalta. The Price of Peace*, *The Man with the Poison Gun: A Cold War Spy Story*, *Chernobyl*, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations* and many other books. Most of Plokhy's books are first published in English. He won a number of international and Ukrainian awards, including the 2018 Shevchenko National Prize for *The Gates of Europe*, Baillie Gifford Prize for Non-Fiction for *Chernobyl*, the Lionel Gelber Prize for *The Last Empire*, etc.

Andriy Portnov is a Ukrainian historian, editor, essayist and translator. He is Professor of Ukrainian History at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. He is the author of more than 200 academic articles on the history of Ukrainian historiography, Polish-Ukrainian-Russian relations, memory issues in Central and Eastern Europe.

Volodymyr Rafeenko is a Ukrainian writer and poet. He lived in Donetsk until 2014, wrote in Russian, and published his works mostly in Russia, where he won several international awards. He moved to Kyiv after the Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression in Donbas. His novel *The Long Days* won the Visegrad Eastern Partnership Award in 2018. His first novel in Ukrainian, *Mondegreen. Songs about Death and Love*, was published in 2019.

Hanna Shelest, PhD, is the editor-in-chief at *UA: Ukraine Analytica* and a member of the board at the Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism". She served for more than 10 years as a Senior Researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Ukraine, Odesa Branch. Dr. Shelest was an adviser for the Working Group preparing the Ukrainian Navy Strategy 2035. She has more than 50 academic articles to her name and more than 100 articles published worldwide in the media.

Haska Shyyan is a Ukrainian poet, writer, translator, founder of the creative trademark *Batrachomypomachia*. She translated the novel *Lights Out in Wonderland* by DBC Pierre. Haska Shyyan is the author of the novels *Hunt*, *Doctor*, *Hunt!* and *Behind the Back*, which won the 2019 European Union Prize for Literature.

Volodymyr Yermolenko (editor of this book) is a Ukrainian philosopher and writer, director for analytics at Internews Ukraine, editor-in-chief of UkraineWorld.org, journalist at hromadske.ua, doctor of political studies at EHESS, Paris. He wrote the books *Narrator and Philosopher*, *Distant People and Close People*, *The Ocean Catcher*. His latest book, *Liquid Ideologies*, won the Yuri Sheveliov Prize for the best Ukrainian book of essays, and Ukrainian Book of the Year award in political studies and non-fiction. He has published articles and essays in numerous international media outlets.

Ukraine in histories and stories. Essays by Ukrainian intellectuals —
Kyiv: Internews Ukraine, UkraineWorld, 2019. — 304 p.

PROJECT TEAM:

Team leader *Andriy Kulakov*

Book editor *Volodymyr Yermolenko*

Coordinator *Iuliia Skubytska*

Project manager *Kateryna Yudina*

Volunteer *Hanna Diomochka*

Design *Olena Padolko*

Layout *Mykhailo Fedyshak*

Translation (Ukrainian-English) *Internews Ukraine Team*

Translation consultant *Valeria Mendez*

English language editor *Peter Dutczyn*

Format 155 × 200 mm. Printing type – offset. Circulation 1000 copies.

Printed at K.I.S. publishing house

This publication is not commercial and not for sale.



Preface by PETER POMERANTSEV

Introduction by ANDRIY KULAKOV

YAROSLAV HRYTSAK

SERHII PLOKHY

YURI ANDRUKHOVYCH

ANDRIY KURKOV

VOLODYMYR YERMOLENKO

ANDRIJ BONDAR

IRENA KARPA

HASKA SHYYAN

VAKHTANG KEBULADZE

LARYSA DENYSENKO

VOLODYMYR RAFEENKO

ALIM ALIEV

OLA HNATIUK

LEONID FINBERG

ANDRIY PORTNOV

HANNA SHELEST

UKRAINIAN
CULTURAL
FOUNDATION

 **INTERNEWS**
UKRAINE

 **UKRAINE**
WORLD